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Under the Act of Congress of July 17th 1862, for the confiscation of enemy's
property, a seizure and sale of land in which the owner, a participant in the rebel-

lion, had an equity oif rcdenption, passed his whole title and left no estate in him
whica lie could subsequently convey.
Nir does the joint resolution of Congress of the same date, limiting the forficitare to the ofleander's life, change the effect of the act. What i. forfeited is not
a teelhnical lif -estate, but the entire estate during a limited period.
The property of W. was mortgaged by him to R., anl subsequently was confiscated and sola by the United States in 1863, under the Act of July 17th 1862, R.
becomi g the purchaser. lit 1866, W. and wife made a deed of the property in
fee simple to it., with covenants of general warranty. In 1872, W. having died,
his heirs filed a bill against R., to redeem as against the mortgage, and to have
the decd of W. iaa 186*6 declared void : Ied, that the bill would lie.

from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
The complainants were children and heirs-at-law of Charles S.
Wallach, who was an officer in the Confederate army during the
late rebellion. While thus in the Confederate service, his real
cs*tate, situate in the city of Washington, was seized by order of the
President, under the Confiscation Act of July 17th 1862, and a
libel for its condemnation was duly filed. The lot of ground, reAPPEAL

specting which the present controversy arose, was condemned Its
forfeited to the United States on the 29th (lay of July 1863, and
on the 9th day of September next following, it was sold under a
writ of venditioni exponas, the defendant, Vat, Riswick, becoming
the purchaser. Prior to the seizure, the lot had been conveyed
by Charles S. Wallach in trust to secure the payment of a proinissory note for five thousand dollars which he had borrowed, and
at the time of the seizure a portion of this debt remained unpaid
and due to the defendant, to whom the note and the security of
the deed of trust had been assigned. Wallach's interest in the
property was, therefore, an equity of 'edemption, and by the confiscation sale the purchaser acquired that interest, and held it
with the security of the deed of trust given to protect the payment
of the promissory note. On the 3d of February 1866, Wallach
having returned to Washington, made a deed purporting to convey
the lot in fee simple with covenants of general warranty to Van
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Riswick, the purchiser at the confiscation sale.

His wife joined

with him in the deed.
So the case stood until February 3d 1872, when Wallach died.
The complainants then filed this bill, claiming that after the
seizure, condemnation and sale of the land, as the property of a
public enemy engaged in the war of the rebellion, nothing remained in him that could be the subject of sale or conveyance;
consequently that nothing passed by the deed from Wallach and"
wife, and that they, being his heirs, had, upon his death, an estate
in the land and a right to redeem, and to have the conveyance of
their father to Van Riswick declared to be no bar to their redemption. The relief sought was redemption of the deed of trust, discovery (particularly of the amount remaining due upon Charles
S.'Wallach's note), an account of the rents and profits of the land
since the death of Wallach, a decree that his deed of February 3d
1866 is of no effect as against the plaintiffs, a decree for delivery
of possession of the lot,. and general relief.
To this bill the defendant, Van Riswick, demurred generally,
and the court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill.
Hence this appeal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The formal objections to the bill deserve but a passing notice. It is not, we think, multifarious, and all persons are
made parties to it who can be concluded or affected by any decree
that may be made; all persons who have an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy. The main question raised by the
demurrer, and that which has been principally argued, is whether,
after an adjudicated forfeiture and sale of an enemy's land under
the Confiscation Act of Congress of July 17th 1862, and the joint
resolution of even date therewith, there is left in him any interest
which he can convey by deed.
The Act of July 17th 1862 is an act for the confiscation of
enemies' property. Its puinpose, as well as its justification, was to
strengthen the government and to enfeeble the public enemy by
taking from the adherents of that enemy the power to use their
property in aid of the hostile cause: Miller v. United States, 11
Wallace 268. With such a purpose, it is incredible that Congress,
while providing for the confiscation of an enemy's land, intended
to leave in that enemy a vested interest therein, which he might
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sell, and with the proceeds of which he might aid in carrying on
the war againist the government. The statute indicates no such
intention. The contrary is plainly manifested. The fifth section
enacted, that it should be the duty of the President of the United
States to c~iuse the seizure of "all tle estate and property, woney,
stocks, credits and effects" of the persons thereinafter described
(of whom Charles S. W;llach was one), and to apply the same and
the proceeds thereof to the support of the army of the United
Sates ; and it declared that all sales, transfers anid conveyances
of aiy such property should be null and void. The description
of property thus made liable to seizure is as broad as possible. It
covers the estate of the owner, all his estate or ownership. No
authority is given to seize less than the whole. The seventh
section of the act enacted, that to secure the condemnation and
sale of any such property (viz., the property seized), so that it
might be made available for the purpose aforesaid, proceedings
should be instituted in a court of the United States, and if said
property should be found to have belonged to a person engaged in
tie rebellion, or who had given aid or comfort thereto, that the
same should be condemned as enemies' property, and become the
property of the United States, and might be disposed of as the
court shoul,l decree, tle proceeds thereof to be paid into tie
treasury of the United States for the purpose aforesaid. Nothing
can be plainer than that condemnation and sale of the identical
property seized was intended by Cong'ress, and it was expressly
leclared that the seizure ordered should be of all the estate and
property of the persons designated in the act. If, therefore, the
question before us were to be answered in view of the proper construction of tie Act of July 17th 1862 alone, there could be no
doubt that the seizure, condemnation and sale of Charles S. Walolacl,'s estate in the lot in controversy, left iii him no estate or
interest of any description which lie could convey 1rv deed, and no
power which lie could exercise in favor of another. This we
understand to be substantially conceded on belirlf of tire defendant.
But tie Act of 1862 is not to be construed exclir.:ively by itself.
Contemporaneously with its approval a joi ,t resolution it as passed
hy Congress and approved, explanatory of some or its provisions,
and declaring that "no proceedings under said act should be so
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construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender
beyond his natural life."
The act and the joint resolution are, doubtless, to be construed
as one act, precisely as if the latter had been introduced into the
former as a proviso. The reasons that induced the passage of the
resolution are well known. It was doubted by some, even in high
places, whether Congress had power to enact that any forfeiture
of the land of a rebel should extend or operate beyond his life.
The doubt was founded on the provision of the Constitution, in
sect. 3d, art. d, that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted." It was not doubted that Congress might provide for
forfeitures effective during the life of an offender. The doubt
related to the possible duration of a forfeiture, not to the thing
forfeited or to the extent and efficiency of the forfeiture while it
continued. It was to meet the doubt which did exist that the
resolution was adopted. What, then, is its effect, and what was
intended by it? Plainly, it should be so construed as to leave it
in accord with the general and leading purpose of the act of which
it is substantially a part, for its object was not to defeat, but to
qualify. That purpose, as we have said, was to take away from
an adherent of a public enemy his property, and thus deprive him
of the means by which he could aid that enemy. But that purpose was thwarted, partially at least, by the resolution, if it meant
to leave a portion, and often much the larger portion, of the estate
still vested in the enemy's adherent. If, notwithstanding an adjudicated forfeiture of his land and a sale thereof, he was still
seized of an estate expectant on the determination of a life-estate,
which lie could sell and convey, his power to aid the public enemy
thereby remained. It cannot be said that such was the intention
of Congress. The residue, if there was any, was equally subject
to seizure, condemnation and sale with the particular estate that
preceded it. And it is to be observed that the joint resolution
ma(le no attempt to divide the estate confiscated into one for life
and another in fee. It did not say the forfeiure shall be of a life-estate only, or of the possession and enjoyment of the property for life.
Its language is, "no proceedings shall work a forfeiture beyond the
life of the offender "-not beyond the life-estate of the offender.
The obvious meaning is that the proceedings for condemnation and
sale shall not affect the ownership of the property after the termi-
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nation of the offender's natural life. After his death the land
shall pass or be owned as if it had not been forfeited. There is
nothing that warrants the belief it was intended that while the
forfeiture lasts it should not be complete, viz., a devolution upon
the United States of the offender's entire right. The words of the
resolution are not exactly those of the constitutional ordinance,
but both have the same meaning and both seek to limit the extent
of forfeitures. In adopting the resolution Congress manifestly had
the constitutional ordinance in view, and there is no reason why
one should receive a construction different from that given to the
other. What was intended by the constitutional provision is free
from doubt. In England attainders of treason worked corruption
of blood and perpetual forfeiture of the estate of the person attainted, to the disherison of his heirs or of those who would
otherwise be his heirs. Thus innocent children were made to suffer
because of the offence of their ancestor. When the Federal Constitution was framed this was felt to be a great hardship, and even
rank injustice. For this reason it was ordained that no attainder
of treason should work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except
(luring the life of the person attainted. No one ever doubted it
was a provision introduced for the benefit of the children and heirs
alone; a declaration that the children should not bear the iniquity
of the fathers. Its purpose has never been thought to be a benefit
to the traitor, by leaving in him a vested interest in the subject
of forfeiture.
There have been some Acts of Parliament providing for limited
forfeitures, closely resembling those described in the Act of Congress as modified by the joint resolution. The statute of 5th
Elizabeth, ch. 11, " against the clipping, washing, rounding and
filing of coins," declared those offences to be treason, and enacted
that the offender or offenders should suffer death and lose and forfeit all his or their goods and chattels, and also "lose and forfeit
all his and their lands and tenements during his or their natural
life or lives only." The statute of 18th Elizabeth, ch. 1, enacted
the same provision "against diminishing and impairing of the
Queen's Majesty's coin and other coins current within the realn'."
and declared that the offender or offenders should "lose and forfelt to the Queen's Highness, her heirs and successors, all their
lands, tenements and hereditaments during his or their natural
life or lives only." Each of these statutes provided that no attain-
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der under it should work corruption of blood or deprive the wife
of an offender of her dower. The statute of 7 Anne, ch. 21, is
similar.
They all provide for a limited forfeiture-limited in
duration, not in quantity. And certainly no case has been found,
none, we think, has ever existed, in which it has been held that
either statute intended to leave in the offender an ulterior estate
in fee after a forfeited life-estate, or any interest whatever subject
to his dispensing power. Indeed, forfeiture has frequently been
spoken of in the English courts as equivalent to conveyance.
It
was in Lord Lovel's Case, Plowden 488, where it was said by
HARPER, Justice, "the act (of attainder) is no more than an instrument of conveyance, when by it the possessions of one man are
trafisferred over to another." And again: "The act conveys it
(the land forfeited) to the king, removes the estate out of Lovel
and vests it entirely in the king."
In Burgess v. lWheate, 1
Eden 201, in discussing the subject of -forfeiture, the 'Master of
the Rolls said, "the forfeiture operated like a grant to the king.
The crown, said he, takes an estate by forfeiture, subject to the
engagements and encumbrances of the person forfeiting. The
crown holds in this case as a royal trustee (for a forfeiture itself
is sometimes called a. royal escheat). * * * If a forfeiture is
regranted by the king the grantee is a tenant in capite, and all
mesne tenure is extinct."
See also Brown v. Waite, 2 Mod. 133.
If a forfeiture is equivalent to a grant or conveyance to the government, how can anything remain in the person whose estate has
been forfeited which he can convey to another ? No conceivable
reason exists why the construction applied to the English statutes
referred to should not be applied to our Act of 1862 and the joint
resolution.
If in the British statutes the sole object of the limitation of the duration of forfeiture was a benefit to the heirs of the
offender, it is the same in our statutes, and it is a perversion of the
intent and meaning of the joint resolution to read it as preserving
rights and interests in those who under the act had forfeited all
their estate. What was seized, condemned as forfeited, and sold
in the proceedings against Charles S. Wallach's estate, was not,
theiefore, technically a life-estate. It is true that in Bigelow v.
Forrest, 9 Wall. 389, and Day v. Micon, 18 Id. 156, some expressions were used indicating an opinion that what was sold under
the confiscation acts was a life-estate carved out of a fee. The
language was, perhaps, incautiously used. We certainly did not
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intend to hold that there was anything left in the person whose
estate had been confiscated.

The (Itestion was not before us.

We were not called upon to decile anything respecting the quantity of the estate carved out, and what we said upon the subject
had reference solely to Its duration.
It is argued on behalf of the defendant that, because under a
confiscation sale of land, or of estate therein, the purchaser takes
an interest terminable with the life of the person whose property
has been confiscated, the fee must be somewhere, for it is said a
fee can never be in abeyance, and as the fee cannot be in the
United States, they having sold all that was seized, nor in the
purchaser, whose interest ceases with the life, it must remain in
the person whose estate has been seized. The argument is more
plausible than sound. It is a maxim of the common law that a
fee cannot be in abeyance. It rcsts upon reasons that now have
no existence, and it is not now of universal application. But if it
were, being a common-law maxim, it must yield to statutory provisions inconsistent with it, and it is, therefore, of no weight in the
inquiry what was intended by the Confiscation Act and concurrent
resolution. Undoubtedly there are some anomalies growing out
of the Congressional legislation, as there were growing out of the
statutes of 5th and 18th Elizabeth, but it is the duty of the court
to carry into effect what Congress intended, though it must be by
denying the applicability of some common-law maxims, the reasons
of which have long since disappeared. It has not been found
necessary in England to hold that a reversion remained in a traitor
after his attaint, though the statutes declared that the forfeiture
shall be (luring his natural life only.
We are not, therefore, called upon to determine where the fee
dwells during the continuance of the interest of a purchaser at a
confiscation sale, whether in the United States or in the purchaser,
subject to be defeated by the death of the offender whose estate
has been confiscated. That it cannot dwell in the offender, we
have seen is evident, for if it does the plain purpose of the Confiscation Act is defeated, and the estate confiscated is subject alike in
the hands of the United States and of the purchaser to a paramount
right remaining in the offender. If he is a tOnant of the reversion,
or of a remainder, he may control the use of the particular estate
at least so far as to prevent waste. That Congress intended such
a possibility is incredible.
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If it be contended that the heirs of Charles S. Wallach cannot
take by descent unless their father, at his death, was seized of an
estate of inheritance, e. g., reversion, or a remainder, it may be
answered that even at common law it was not always necessary
the ancestor should be seized to enable the heir to take by
descent. Shelley's Case is, that where the ancestor miglht have
taken and been seized, the heirs shall inherit. (FoRTESCUE, J.,
Thornby v. Fleetwood, 1 Stranige 318.)
And it it were true that at common law the heirs could not take
in any case, where their ancestor was not seized at his death, the
present case must be determined by the statute. Charles S. Wallach was seized of the entire fee of the land before its confiscation,
and the Act of Congress interposed to take from him that seisin
for a limited time. That it was competent to do, attaching the
limitation for the benefit of the heirs. It wrought no corruption
of blood. In Lord De La lTrarre's Uase, 11 Coke 1, a, it was
resolved by the justices "that there was a difference betwixt disability personal and temporary, and a disability absolute and perpetual ; as where one is attainted of treason or felony, that is an
absolute and perpetual disability, by corruption of blood, for any
of his posterity to claim any inheritance in fee simple, either as
heir to him or to any ancestor above him ; but when one is disabled by Parliament (without any attainder) to claim the dignity
for his life, it is personal disability for his life only, and his heir
after his death may claim as heir to him or to any ancestor above
him." There is close analogy between that case and the present.
See also Vlteatley v. Thomas, Levinz 74.
.Without pursuing this discussion further, we repeat that to hold
that any estate or interest remained in Charles S. Wallach after
the confiscation and sale of the land in controversy, would defeat
the avowed purpose of the Confiscation Act, and the only justification for its enaotment ; and to hold that the joint resolution was
not intended for the benefit of his heirs exclusively, to enable
them to take the inheritance after his death, would give preference
to the guilty over the innocent. We cannot so .hold. In our
judgment, such a .holding would be an entire perversion of the
meaning of Congress.
It has been argued that the proclamation of amnesty after the
close of the war restored to Charles S. Wallach his rights of property. The argument requires but a word in answer. Conced-

WALLACII r. VAN iUSWICK.

ing that amnesty did restore wihat the United btates held when
the proclamation was issued, it could not restore what the United

States had ceased to hold. It could not give back the property
which had been sold, or any interest in it, either in possession or
(xpectancy: Sennes v. United S~tates, in this court not yet reported. Besides, the proclamation of amnesty was not made until
December 25th 18G8.
The decree of the Supreme Court of the District dismissing the
ronplainant's bill is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remitted
for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
The above decision is one of very considerahic importance, as well from the
principles involved as from the effect it
may have upon other estates similarly
situated. And after repeated reading-,
with every disposition to view it in the
most favorable light, we cannot say that
either the construction ofthe court or the
reasoning of the learned judge appear entirely satisfactory. It is an admitted departure from the natural and obvious import of the language of the statute, when
viewed, as the court concede it must be,
in connection with the joint resolution
of the same date. The learned judge
feels compelled to apologize for the
language of the court in other cases,
where the same statute was involved,
but not upon the very point here determined. We comprehend very well
that such incidental language of the
court, where the very point here determined was not before them, is not by any
means to be treated as a conclusive adjudication of the present question. But
tile general language, which good lawyers, and especially good judges, adopt
in defining the scope and purport of a
statute then under consideration, is
surely to le regarded as conclusive of
the natural and primary import of the
terms of the statute. There will be no
difference of opinion upon this point
among good lawyers. What then is
the ground upon which the court here
attempts to justify the adoption of a
becoudary and unnatural construction
VOL. XXIV.-43

(if the language of this statute ? Why,
merely that " it is incredible that Congress, while providing for the cunfiseation of an enemy's land, intended to
leave to that enemy a vested interest
therein," which he might still apply to
the purpose of carrying on the war.
If the case were to be determined upon
the probable general "intent" of Congress in passing the statute, we should
not dissent from almost any view the
court might adopt, however extreme.
But tie word "1intent," when used with
refierence to a statute or the legislature
passing it, means the intent expressed
in the language thereto used, in its
natural and ordinary sense, when construed with reference to the subjectnatter. And when the express lan''shall
guage of this enactment is thait"
not work a forfeiture beyond the life of
the offtniler," we think it fair to say
that it means just what it says, " a forfeiture" of the estate of the offender
beyond his life or of his lifetime. If
uo give it any more extended import
thtan that of a muere life estate, we give
it a forced and unnatural constructimn,
and we do this in the case of a statute
highly penal, where the party against
whom it operates is entitled to demand
the solution of all doubts in his favor.
We, in effect, make the forfeiture of the
life estate embrace the reversion without
any adequate words. And we also encounter many other anomalies, as the
court frankly admit. We place the fee
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of the estate literallynowhere, which is
a result not to be found in any modern
ease to our knowledge; and we further
allow the heirs to inherit an estate which
did not exist in that ancestor. These
are anomalies which we have no doubt
Congress had power to provide for,
and perhaps would have provided for,
if these contingencies had been suggested, but it could not have been done
short of the use of very express ,language. And for the court to now add
these provisions to the statute, by mere
construction, without any adequate language, and in violation of the natural
import of the terms in which it is expressed, anid in order to render a penal
statute more penal, is sufficiently at
variance with the settled course of statutory construction to excite surprise in
all minds, when we consider the high
character of the court from which it
comes.
There may be some escape from this
apparent anomalous character of the
decision, but we have sought in vain for
it, in the opinion of the learned judge.
All that is there said about the construction of the English courts of forfeitures
under their statutes for punishing crimes,
seems to us wholly irrelevant. This is
not in any sense a forfeiture for crime.
It is not strictly a forfeiture at all. That
would imply a previous trial and conviction, of which there is no pretence
here. This is merely a proceeding
against the estate of Wallach in the
land, not because of any alleged crime,
except that of being an enemy in time
of war, which may depend upon his
residence, and ordinarily does. But
however that may be, here it is certainly
no crime, and if it were, would work no
forfeiture until after conviction. This
seizure of enemies' property, within the
territories of the belligerents, is no new
thing. It is well understood and clearly
defined by all writers upon international
law. The only difference between this
and ordinary cases of the character is,

that commonly nations are content to
capture or confiscate the usufruct of
enemies' real estate during the war:
Byik. L. 1, e. 7 ; Vattel, L. iii., c. 5,
76; Twiss on Law of Nations 118,
61. But here the statute grasps the
whole life estate of the enemy, and the
court extend it virtually over the fee
and the reversion by mere construction.
It seems to us that the unsatisfactory
nature of the opinion in this case is the
natural and necessary result of the impossible task set the learned judge by
the court of justifying an erroneous decision. If the decision were the other
way there would be no embarrassment
in finding good reasons for it. It would,
in fact, require no argument to support
it, since it would be but following the
natural import of the very term!; of the
statute. How then, it may fairly be
asked, can the court know that Congress
intended to deprive Wallach of every
possible estate in this land, when no
such thing is said, but the contrary ?
And how can it be fairly inferred, from
anything in this statute, that Congress
felt any special interest on behalf of
the heirs, more than of Wallach himself? The natural presumption would
be that the heirs were as likely to be
enemies to the government as the ancestor. The truth probably is that Congress made up, in their own imagination, some fancied analogy between the
confiscation of enemies' property, and
the forfeiture of estate consequent upon
conviction for treason, as defined in the
constitution, and attached the joint resolution as a condition to the statute, lest
the whole might fail from attempting
too much. All this was, no doubt,
founded in mistake. But it cxplaini
why the statute did not attempt any
seizure of enemies' estate beyond the
limit of their own lives. And this
would not naturally embrace the fee, or
the right to convey it, with the reversion
or remainder. There was no attainder
or corruption of blood. There was not

WIIITRIDGI s'v. BARRY.
even the declaration that enemies should
be regarded as aliens, thus depriving
them of the right to transmit their real
estate in any of the ordinary modes by
deed, or devise, or descent. They stood
in all respects as they did before the
seizure or confiscation, with full power
to transmit their estates. in the premises
by all the modes named. And there
seems to us no just ground to argue
that Wallach had not all the estate lie
ever had in this land, except his lifeestate. This, we see very dlearly, lie
had lost, and neither the termination
, f the war nor the amnesty would restore it to him, because neither could
undo the facts upon which the confiscation proceeded.
We trust we have made the grounds
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of our dissent from the decision clear,
and that we have done so i such moderate and courteous terms as are not inconsistent with our unqualified respect
for the court, and the learned judge in
particular who gave the opinion. And
while we feel that our views may possibly be founded in error, not being able
to feel the same confidence in our conclusions as we might upon some subjects
with which we had been more familiar,
we must, nevertheless, insist that in
every view we are able to take of the
matter the decision is at variance with
all the well established canons of statutory construction known to the law, so
far as involved in the ease.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of _faryland.
HORATIO L. WIHTRIDGE v. ROSALIE C. BARRY.
On a bill of interhleader filed in a Maryland court, to settle the conflicting
claims of two parties under a policy of insurance made payable in Philadelphia,
growing out of an assignment of the policy made in the city of New York, both
parties having appeared to the suit, the case must he disposed of according to the
law of Maryland.
A policy of insurance taken on the life of a husband for the sole use of his
wife, and payable to her or her assigns, is a chose in action of the wife's, which she
has the right to assign or otherwise dispose of with her husband's consent.
The wife holding such policy, attached her signature to a blank printed form not
attached to the policy, without name of assignee or (late, and with no directions
from her as to filling up the blanks or as to the delivery of the paper or policy.
Whether such a paper signed and delivered in blank with an express or implied
authority from the party signing it to fill up the blank to the person to whom it is
delivered, as he thought proper, and who afterwards filled it up accordingly, is a
valid assignment sufficient to pass the title to the chose in action, Que ?
The advance to B. byA. of certain promissory notes, to a large amount, which
lie had finally to pay, upon the faith of B.'s securing him by the assignment of
policies of insurance and other property, constitutes a sufficient consideration to
support B.'s assignment to A. of such policies.
The signature of afeme corert to the assignment of a policy of insurance effected
for her sole use, made with the consent of her husband, is sufficient without his
signature.
.The 2d sect. of art. 45 of the Code, providing for the conveyance of the wife's
property by a joint deed with her husband, nand the I Ith sect. where the husband
is required to join in the conveyance, were intended to apply to such conveyances
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of her property as were required by law to be made by all persons, by deed or
other instrument of writing, as the case might be. They do not exclude the ordinary method of conveyance.
But whatever tht nature of the transfer, from regard to the interesta of husband
and wife, it must be made with the concurrence of the husband, express or implied.
A policy of insurance was taken on the life of a husband for the sole use of his
wife, and payable to her or her assigns. The wife, influenced by the importunity
of her husband, and under circumstances amounting to a controlling duress, and
which deprived her of that necessary freedom in the exercise of her mental faculties to make the act binding upon her, attached her signature to a blank printed
form not attached to the policy, without name of assignee or date, or designation
of the policy, and with no direction from her as to filling the blanks or delivery
of the assignment or policy. B. having advanced to the husband certain promissory notes to a large amount, which he had finally to pay, upon the faith of the
husband's securing him by the assignment of policies of insurance and other properry, the husband caused the assignment to be filled up with a transfer of the
policy aforesaid to B., and delivered this assignment and subsequently also the
policy itself to B. Upon the death of the husband, in a contest between the wife
and the assignee of B. (for the benefit of creditors), as to which was entitled to
recover on the policy, it was held, 1. That B.'s assignee could claim no greater
right than B. held in the policy ;- 2. That the wife was entitled to recover, as the
importunity under which she signed the instrument of assignment was such as to
deprive her of her free agency, or such as she was too weak to resist, and she
ought not to be held responsible therefor.

from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
This was a bill of interpleader, filed by the National Life Insurance Company of the United States of America, chartered by Act
of Congfess, to have determined the respective rights of Rosalie
C. Barry and Horatio L. Whitridge, trustee of William H.
Brune, to the proceeds of a policy of insurance effected on the
life of John S. Barry, husband of said Rosalie. The policy was
made at Washington, D. C., August 28th 1868, for $5000, in
favor of Rosalie C. Barry, to her sole use, if living, and to her
executors, administrators and assigns, if dead ; with a provision
authorizing its assignment by way of security or absolutely, and
made payable at Philadelphia.
About the beginning of August 1871, Rosalie C. Barry assigned
this policy for a valuable consideration to William H. Brune; who
received said assignment from John S. Barry, August 3d 1871,
and subsequently, on the 13th of February 1872, made a general
assignment of all his estate and effects, including the policy of
insurance, to Horatio L. Whitridge, for the benefit of his creditors.
The assignment to Brune grew out of the following facts:
At several times prior to the assignment, Brune, trading under
APPEAL

WHITRIDGE v. BARRY.

the name of F. W. Brune & Sons, at the solicitation of said Barry,
for his accommodation, and upon the pledge that the notes should
be held sacred and certainly paid, and the loan secured by an assigrnent of policies of insurance on the life of said Barry, and
of other property, loaned to Barry the promissory notes of F. W.
Brune & Sons, to the amount of about $80,000, all of which notes
Brune had ultimately to pay, which so seriously embarrassed him
-as to compel his failure, and the (Iced in trust toWhitridge. After
the maturity and non-payment by Barry and the payment by Brune
of a portion of the notes so loaned, Barry, in partial fulfilment
of his promise to secure him, sent to Brune in August 1871, an
assignment, executed by Rosalie C. Barry, in favor of Brune, with
power of attorney annexed, of certain policies of insurance on her
husband's life, in her favor, among which was the policy in question in this suit, and Brune thereafter renewed certain of the matured notes which he afterwards paid. The policies covered by
the assignment were subsequently also handed to Brune.
This assignment was executed by Rosalie C. Barry, in blank,
and filled up with the transfer of the policies aforesaid, by the
direction of John S. Barry, to whom she had given it so signed by
herself.
John S. Barry (lied in the city of New York on the 9th of
March 1872, and the insurance company having refused payment
under said policy to Whitridge, because of the claim and suit
therefor of said Rosalie, instituted at Philadelphia, Whitridge
brought suit against the company in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, which was afterwards discontinued.
Other facts in the case are stated in the opinion of this court.
The appeal is taken from the decree of the Circuit Court, awarding the amount of the policy to Rosalie C. Barry.
J. lXorrison Harris and Fred. IV. Brune, for the appellant.This is to be construed as a Maryland contract; and a Maryland
court, adjudicating the administration of a fund under its own
jurisdiction, is bound to maintain and enforce an assignment valid
under Maryland law, even if such assignment might be held invalid under the laws of New York, where said Rosalie C. Barry
was living at the time of its execution: Wilson v. Carson,12 Md.
75; Smith v. 2JeAtee, 27 Id. 438, 439; Story'n Confl. of Laws,
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This assignment of a chose in action created and settled to the
sole and separate use of Mrs. Barry, voluntarily signed by her in
blank, handed to her husband, by his direction filled up,'with a
transfer among other things of the policy in question, was transferred to and held by Brune, under circumstances that made him a
holder for value, and vested in him a legal and sufficient title to
the proceeds of the policy.
It is not necessary to constitute a bond fide holding that the
value should have been paid at the time of receiving the securitya part consideration is sufficient: Sawyer v. Prickett et ux., 19
Wallace 166; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1; Goodman v. Simonds,
20 Howard 343.
Brune being 'in possession bond fide of the assignment, and a
holder for value, cannot be affected in his rights by the assumed
misrepresentations by which the husband is said to have procured
it from his wife; because he was not cognisant of the means used
and in no way aided or abetted them: Corbett v. Brock, 20 Beav.
524; Van -Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 535; Hall v. Hinks, 21
Md. 416, 417; Powell v. Bradlee, 9 G. & J. 220.
She handed the assignment to her husband in blank, which gave
him the right to fill it up; and her act held him out as the owner
of, or as having power of disposition over, the property, and
parties innocent of the fraud, dealing with him for value, are protected against her claim: V7an Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 585;
N. Y. & IV. H. Railroad CYo. v. Schuyler, 84 Id. 59 ; McNeil v.
iM1ass.
Tenth National Bank, 46 Id. 329; White v. Vrermont
Eq.
10
Rep.
Law
Davis,
v.
AcHenrj
Railroad, 21 Howard 576;
Af1echanies'
413;
Penna.
27
Cases 88. See also Carr v. Le Pevre,
Bank v. N. Y. Railroad, 4 Duer 480, 539, 582; Carpenter v.
Longan, 16 Wallace 273.
The appellee is estopped from disavowing the legitimate conseauence of her act .in thus allowing her husband to hold himself
out as the owner of. or having full power of disposition over. the
pronerty, because Brune was misled by it to his prejudice: this
constitutes an estoppel in pais: Freeman v. Buckingham, 18
Howard 182; Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301; for admissions
acted on by others, whether true or false, are conclusive against the
party making them in all cases between him and the party whose
conduct he has thus influenced: XlieClellan et ux. v.. Kenne'y, 3
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Md. 230. See also AJcCelellan v. Kennedy, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 247;
11all v. Jinks, 21 Id. 416, 417.
John P. Poe and . Nevett Steele, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STEWART, J.-The National Life Insurance Company filed a
bill of interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
lringitig the fund in dispute within that jurisdiction for deteruination.
The respective claimants of the proceeds of the policy in question, under the decree of interpleader, have appeared, and the
case must be disposed of according to the law of this state.
It seems to be conceded, on all sides, that the lex fori must
govern in the determination of the case.
The policy in question was taken on the life of John S. Barry,
for the sole use of his wife, Mrs. Barry, the appellee, to whom it
was made payable, or to her assigns.
There can be no doubt, it was a chose in action of hers, which
she had the right to assign, or otherwise dispose of, with her
husband's consent: IV. Y. Ljfe ns. Co. v. Flack, .3 Md. 341;
.Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 185.
The alleged assignment was not endorsed on the policy; Mrs.
Barry's signature was attached to a blank printed form of assignment, without name or date, and with no direction from her as to
the filling up of the blanks with the name of any person, or with
one or more, or all of her policies; or to deliver the paper, or
policy, signed by her, to any person. Whether such a paper,
signed and delivered in blank, with an express or implied authority, from the party signing it, to fill up the blank, to the person
to whom it is delivered, as he thought proper, and who afterwards
filled it up accordingly, is a valid assignment and sufficient to
pass the title to the chose in action, it is not necessary, from the
view we take of this case, to decide. The authorities are conflicting, and it is a debatable question. See Kent v. Somerville,
7 G. & J. 265 ; Chesley v. Taylor, 3 Gill 257 ; Shriner v. Lamborn, 12 Md. 174; ,Spiker v. Nydegger, 30 Id. 315; Byers v.
M c(lanahan, 6 G. & J. 250; White v. Vermont and 11Iass. ]Railroad Co., 21 Howard 375; M'c'eil v. Tenth National Bank, 46
N. Y. 329 ;. Litch v. 7I'ells, 48 Id. 637; .Edqerton v. Thomas,
5 Selden 40; Dawson v. Coles, 16 Johnson 54; Drury v. Foster,
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2 Wallace 24; Iibblewhite v. .McMorine, 6 Mees. & Wels. 200.
Brune having advanced to Barry certain promissory notes, to a
large amount, which he had finally to pay, upon the faith of Barry's
securing him by the assignment of policies of insurance and other
property- constituted a sufficient consideration to support Mr.
Barry's assignment to Brune of the policy in question: fannau
v.Towers, 3 H. & J. 147; Stevenson v. Reigart, 1 Gill 27.
We treat the matter as it affected Brune; his assignee, Whitridge, can claim no greater right than Brune held in the policy.
The signature of Mrs. Barry to the assignment of the policy
(if the assignment was otherwise valid), made with the consent of
her husband, would be sufficient without his signature thereto.
Whether he signed with her or not, was not material to its validity.
Before the Code, the wife, as to her separate property, if not
restricted to a prescribed inode, could convey it as if she were a
ferne sole: Cook v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492; Chew's Adm. v. Beall,
13 Id. 348 ; Buchanan. v. Turner, 26 Id. 1.
The 2d sect. of 45th art. of Code provides for the conveyance
of the wife's property by a joint deed with the husband; arid the
11th section, where the husband is required to join in the cotiveyance, were intended to apply to such conveyances of her property
as are otherwise required by the law to be made by all persons,
by deed or other instrument of writing, as the case may be. They
do not exclude the ordinary methods of conveyance.
The purpose of these provisions was to enable the wife, with the
concurrence of her husband, to dispose of her property by the
usual modes, and not to restrict the power of conveyance so as to
require that every portion of her property, however minute, should
be conveyed by herself and husband by solemn instrument of
writing.
But whatever the nature of the transfer, from regard to the
interest of husband and wife, it must be made with the concurrence of the husband, express or implied.
Mrs. Barry, who thus executed the alleged assignment of the
policy, appears from the evidence to have been not at all deficient
in mental capacity to understand what she was doing; on the
contrary, endowed with more than ordinary intelligence. But,
notwithstanding such was the character of her mind, the evidence, mainly from herself, shows to a sufficient extent, although.
not free from difficulty, that at the time she executed the assigii-
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ment in question, she was laborinig under controlling duress, and
had tot that necessary freedom, in the exercise of her mental
fuculties, to make the act binding upon her, to all intents and
purposes.
Mrs. Barry seems to have been advised of the views and financial efforts of her husband; was made familiar with his plans and
schemes, and fully impressed, by his persistent importunities, with
serious apprehension as to his coudition andl the state of his affairs.
According to her statement, admitted hs evidence, she seemed
to have been fearful of the consequences as to his future course,
if she failed to sign the paper as he requested. Most undoubtedly
she was much exercised over this matter, hesitating and undetermined as to what she should do. But after having repeatedly
before refused to sign the instrument left with her for the purpose, she was induced to change her purpose.
In determining as to her moral freedom, in the execution of the
act, as affeting her legal responsibility, her relation as wife to
her husband must have much force; and adequate allowance
should be made therefir. The circumstances surrounding her and
her husband giving character to the act, must be duly considered.
From a full consideration of all the evidence, we are constrained
to the conclusion that there was such a pressure upon her, from
the codition of her husband and apprehended consequences, she
was deprived of that moral agency requisite to a binding act, in
the conveyance of her policy, and that she ought not to be held
responsible therefor.
Such was the unanimous opinion of the judges of the Court
of Appeals of New York, upon the same testimony, affirming the
action of the inferior court, anl deciding that her signature was
to be considered as affixed under duress and compulsion. Much
respect is due to the opinion of that learned tribunal, and without
very convincing evidence to the contrary, their conclusion is not
to be disregarded.
A court of equity cannot hold her bound by her act, under the
circumstances. Whilst it is not every degree of importunity that
is sufficient to invalidate an instrument transferring property, yet
if it be such, as to deprive the party executing it of her free agency,
or such as she is too weak to resist, she ought not to be held responsible therefor: Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269; Wittman etux. v.
VOL. XXIV.-44
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Goodhand, 26 Md: 95. The facts disclosed in this case must give
the appellee the benefit of such defence.
From a careful consideration of the evidence, and the. principles
of law and equity applicable thereto, we think Mrs. Barry ought
not to be estopped from claiming the fund in court, and it must be
paid over to her.
Decree affirmed and cause remanded.

Circuit Court of the United States, District of Connecticut.
WILLIAM K. LOTHROP

FT AL. V.

JOHN W. STEDMAN

ET AL.

The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void for unconstitutionality is only
to be exercised in clear cases, and this rule applies with especiar force to decisions
upon motions for provisional injunctions.
The principle that a stockholder of a company cannot -maintain a bill in equity
against a wrongdoer to prevent an injury to the corporation, unless it shall be
averred, and shall offirmati.vely appear, that the corporation has refused to take
measures to protect itself, does not extend to a bill which is in good faith filed by
a creditor.
A holder of a policy in an insurance company is a creditor within this rule.
A charter is a contract between the state and the corporators, and the corporation takes the grant subject to the limitations contained in the act of incorporation. If no power of repeal is reserved, none can be cxercised ; but when a
charter itself or a general statute provides that the charter is Subject to repeal by
the legislature, at its pleasure, without restrictions or conditions limiting the power
of repeal, the legislature ha the right to exercise its power summarily and at will.
and its action, being a legislative and not a judicial act, cannot be reviewed by
the courts, unless it should exercise its power so wantonly and carelessly as to
palpably violate the principles of natural justice.
A repeal of a charter does not of itself violate or impair the obligations of any
contract which the corporation has entered into. But the legislature cannot establish such rules in regard to the management and disposition of the assets of the
corporation, that the avails shall be diverted from or divided unfairly and unequally among th& creditors, and thus impair the obligation of contracts, or that
the portion of the avails which belong to the stockholders shall be sequestered and
diverted from the owners, and thus injure vested rights.
The legislature has the right to appoint a trustee, to take the assets and manage
the affairs of a corporation, whose charter hes been repealed, in conformity with
the general, just rules which it has prescribed, or with the rules of a court of
equity, if no statutory provisions have been enacted. If no trustee is appointed
by the legislature, a court of equity, which never allows a trust to fail for the
want.of a trustee, would see to the execution of that trust, although by the dissolution of the corporation, the legal title to the property had been changed.
Though the statement of facts in a preamble to a statute is not evidence as
against a party whose rights are affected without his consent, yet where the legis-
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lature doe- an act within its powers, a statement of its reasons in a preamble will
not affect tile validity of its net.
A statute repealing a charter at a certain date, provided that the company shall
make up a deiicieney in its assets belore that date, then the charter shall remain in
Force, and appointing a special tribunal to determine whether the deficiency is

made up or iot, is not a delegation of legislative power and is valid.
may be passed to take cffect on the happening of a future event.

A statute

'MoTION for injtinction.

The bill was filed September 11th 1875, and on the same day a
motion was made for a provisional injunction, pending the hearing
on which an ex parte injunction was granted. The facts are stated
in the opinion.
Wi. D). Shilmian and Wilt. I.
plainants.

llfacFarland for the com-

Simeon B. Baldwin, for the insurance commissioner, one of
the defendants.
No counsel appeared for the insurance company, which was the
other defendant.
SHIPMAN, J.-The American National Life and Trust Company
was incorporated by the General Assembly of the state of Connecticut in the year 1A66, under the name of the American National
Life Insurance Company. The eighth section of the charter is as
follows: "This resolution * * * may be altered, amended or
repealed at the pleasure of the General Assembly."
A statute of tile state passed in 1871, relating in part to life
insurance companies, and creating the office of insurance cominissioner, provided in substance, that if it should appear to the
commissioner from any report, valuation or examination of any
life insurance company, that the assets of any such company
incorporated by this state, were less than its liabilities, the commissioner should, at his discretion, bring a petition to the proper
court of probate, praying for the appointment of" a trustee, to
take possession of the property of such company for the benefit
of its creditors, an(, if it should appear that the assets were less
in amount than three-fourths of the liabilities of such company,
the act made it imperative upon the commissioner to bring such
petition without delay.
On November 23d 1874. Mr. John W. Stedman. then and now
insurance commissioner of this state, preferred his petition to the
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proper probate court, alleging that the result of an examination
of the financial condition of the American National Life and Trust
Company, and a valuation of its policies and assets, disclosed that
the assets of the company were less than its liabilities, and less
than three-fourths of its liabilities, and praying for the appointment
of a trustee. After a full hearing, said court having called to its
assistance a judge of the superior court, in pursuance of a statute
of the state, found that "the allegation that such assets are less
than three-fourths of the liabilities is untrue, that the allegation
that the assets of said company are less than its liabilities is true,
and the court further finds that the deficiency is not such that the
prayer of the petition should be granted," and dismissed the petition. The insurance commissioner presented to the General Assembly, at their May session 1875, a special report upon the affairs
of this company, and at the same session, the legislature passed the
following joint resolution :" Whereas the Ametican Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
Haven, has transferred its assets to the American National Life and Trust
Company of New Haven, and has ceased blusiness, said last-named company assuming the liabilities of said American Mutual Life Insurance
Company; and whereas, it appears from 'the report of the insurance
commissioner relating to the affairs of said Anierican National Life and
Trust Company, that the liabilities of said company exceed its assets
more than $400,000 ; and whereas, said company has neglected and refused to render to the insurance commissioner a report of its condition
and affairs as required by law ; therefore,
" Resolved by this Assembly, That the charter of said American

Mutual Insurance Company and the charter of said American National
Life and Trust Company shall, on the 1st day of September A. 1). 1875,
be, and become wholly and absolutely repealed and annulled ; 1'roidhd,
however. that if said American National Life and Trust Company shall,
before said 1st day of September 1875, supply the deficiency existing
in its assets, and receive from the insurance commissioner a certificate
showing that the assets of said company are sufficient to satisfy all outstanding and unpaid debts and claims, and to provide a full reinsurance
reserve upon its policies in force, to be ascertained as now required by
law, then the charter of said companies shall remain in full force, and
shall not, by this resolution, be repealed or annulled ; PAovided fitrlher,
if there shall be any disagreement between the insurance commissioner
and said American National Life and Trust. Company as to the amnpunt
of assets, their value and their sufficiency, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Errors shall, upon the application of either the insurance commissioner or said company, designate one of the judges of
the Superior Court to sit with him, and they shall fully hear the parties
and determine the amount of such assets, their value and sufficiency,
and their determination shall be conclusive; and they shall thereupon
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issue their certificate of the amount of the deficiency, if any, to be paid
in ; and if said comipany shall, within thirty days after the delivery of
said certificate to the secretary of said company, pay in the deficiency
therein stated ; this resolution shall become inoperative and void. The
decision of said j udges shall be inadc, and said certificate shall be delivered to said secretary bctbre -Noveniber 1st 1875.
• " ii.,lpoVUlJ'rtl~~r,that in case of a disagreement between the
said company and the insurance cominissioner as to the value or sufficiency of its assets, and said company does not supply the deficiency in
its assets on or before the 1st day of Septemlber 1875, the insurance
conmns.,sioncr shall then and thereupon, on said 1st day of September
1875, take possession of all the assets, books and papers of said company,
and hold the sanie subject to the order of said chief judge, and to be
(tisposed of as provided by law."
At the same session the legislature passed a statute in regard to
the disposition of the assets of life insurance companies upon the
repeal of their charters, providing in substance, that the title of
the assets of any such corporation should vest absolutely, and in
fee simple, in the insurance commissioner, who should hold and
dispose of the same for the use and benefit of policy holders of
such company, and such other persons as may be interested in such
assets, and divide the avails in a specified order, and be subject to
the direction and control of the superior court for the county
within which the corporation should be situate.
The American National Life and Trust Company did not, prior
to September 1st 1875, supply to the satisfaction of the commissioner the alleged deficiency in its assets, nd disagreed with that
officer in regard to the amount, value and sufficiency thereof. le
made preparations to take possession of the property of the company on September 1st 1875, and prior to the investigation by
the chief justice and his associate.
The company thereafter
brought a petition before the Superior Court for New Haven
county, to enjoin the commissioner against his proposed action:
a temporary exparte injunction was granted, which was dissolved
by his honor, Judge BEARDSLEY, on motion of the insurance
commissioner, and after a hearing of the parties. A temporary
and ex parte injunction has also been granted by Judge ROBINSON,
of the Court of Common Pleas, upon the petition of the insurance
commissioner, to restrain the directors and executive officers of
the company from disposing of its assets.
Sundry citizens of the state of New York who hold and own
policies of insurance which have been issued by said company, on
which it is liable to pay, by virtue of lawful contracts heretofore
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entered into, have brought their bill in equity before this court
against the commissioner and said corporation, alleging its solvency,
praying that the commissioner be enjoined against taking possession of said assets, and that the company be enjoined against
delivering such possession, mainly and principally upon the ground
that the resolution of the General Assembly which has been quoted,
and which is the foundation of the authority of the commissioner
so to take possession, is void and of no effect. The reasons which
are urged in support of this position will be stated hereafter.
The complainants have also moved for the issuing of a provisional
injunction to restrain the commissioner from taking possession of
the assets of the company until the final hearing of the bill, and
upon this motion counsel for the complainants and for the commissioner have been heard at length.
The only question now to be decided is, whether a provisional
injunction should be granted ?
The general principles of law which are involved in this case are
of great importance, and concern pecuniary interests in this country
of no ordinary magnitude, and would justify me in taking more
time for the consideration of this motion than I am now able to
give. It is proper that a hearing, which will soon take place
before Chief Justice PARK and his associate, in regard to the value
of the assets of the company, should not be embarrassed by the
pendency of any undecided motions in this court, and it is due to
the policy-holders in this company that they should be speedily
apprised by the decisions of courts in regard to the management
of its property. These considerations demand a prompt decision,
and prevent anything more than a succinct statement of the principles which I deem applicable to the case.
It is obvibus at the outset, that the question I am asked to determine has always been considered by courts one of grave importance.
"The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void and to
arrest its execution, is one, which in the opinion of all courts, is
coupled with responsibilities so grave, that it is never to be exercised except in very clear cases; one department of the government is bound to presume that another has acted rightly. The
party who wishes us to pronounce ahaw unconstitutional takes upon
himself the burden of proving beyond doubt that it is so :" Erie
&"N. E. Railroad Co. v. Casey, 26 Penna. St. 287, per BLACK, J.
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It should be a very clear case to justify a court in deccding th.at
an act of the legislature is invalid, upon a motion for a provisional
injunction, a proceeding which addresses itself particularly to
judicial discretion.

The defendant corporation is a stock corporation authorized to
issue life policies upon the mutual plan of insurance, but it is not
strictly a mutual insurance company, and the policy-holders are
not necessarily members of the corporation, and have no right to
participate in its management. The complainants appear before
the court only as creditors of the company. Being citizens of the
state of New York, they have a right to bring this bill against the
defendants, citizens of Connecticut, and their interest as creditors
of the corporation and cestuis que tru8t of the fund which is now
in the control of the directors of the corporation, entitles them to
maintain their suit if they have suffered injury. The principle
that a stockholder of a company cannot maintain a bill in equity
against a wrongdoer to prevent an injury to the corporation, unless
it shall be averred, and shall affirmatively appear, that the corpnration has refused to take measures to protect itself, does not extend
to a bill which is in good faith filed by a creditor.
It is suggested that the questions in this case are the same as
those which are stated in the petition of the insurance company
noi- pending in the Superior Court, and that they have already
been virtually passed upon by the decision of Judge BEARDSLEY.
While the decision of any judge upon a motion for a temporary
injunction is not a controlling authority, yet it is true that the
same general questions which are here presented, were discussed
in an argument before Judge BEARDSLEY, and the fact that an
eminent judge of this state had in effect refused the injunction
when it was urged by the insurance company, should properly
lead me to exercise caution before I granted it in an action which.
though brought by the policy holders. the affidavits on file in
this case tend to show was instituted at the instance of the corn
pany.
The counsel in the case are not seriously at issue as to the
principles which are applicable to the repeal of the charters by
legislation.
A charter is a contract between the state and the corporators,
and the corporation takes the grant subject to the limitations
which are contained in the act of incorporation. If no power of
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repeal is reserved, none can be exercised; but when a charter
itself or a general statute provides that the charter is subject to
repeal by the legislature, at its pleasure, without restrictions or
conditions limiting the power of repeal, the legislature* has the
right to exercise its power summarily and at will, and its action,
being a legislative and not a judicial act, cannot be reviewed by
the courts, unless it should exercise its power so wantonly and
causelessly as palpably to violate the principles of natural justice,
and in such case, a repeal, like other legislative acts, which do
thus palpably violate the principles of natural justice, may be reviewed by courts. The power of the legislature therefore is not
unlimited, for the private rights of persons are not subject to an
unjust and despotic exercise of power by a legislature without
means of redress. "The theory of our governments, state and
national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere:
the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these
governments are all of limited and deferred power :" Loan A88ociation v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 663. It is always to be presumed
that the legislature has exercised its great powers for adequate
cause, and the extreme caution with which legislatures ordinarily
act upon the subject of the repeal of charters fully warrants such
a presumption.
It is to be observed, that this charter, like the majority of Con.
necticut charters, provides that it may be repealed "at the pleasure of the General Assembly." It is unlike the charters in the
Pennsylvania cases of Erie
.
. Railroad Co. v Casey, 26
Penna. St. 287, and Commonwealth v. -Pittsburgh& Connellsville
Railroad Co', 58 Id. 46, which provided that, if the companies
should abuse or misuse their franchises, the charter should be subject to repeal. There isno question here whether the legislature
is or is not the final judge, whether the contingency upon which
the authority to repeal is based has occurred. The language of
this charter is also unlike the charter which was examined in Allen
v. AcKeen, 1 Sumn. 276, which provides that the legislature
could alter, limit, restrain or annul the powers conferred, and in
which case the court held that a right of absolute repeal was not
reserved. The right of repeal is here expressly reserved, is to be
exercised at the pleasure of the General Assembly, and is subject
only to the limitation which I have suggested.
It is not material, whether the Court of Probate had or had not
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decided that it was not expedient to appoint a trustee. That court
simply found that the company was insolvent, but that its assets
were not less than three-fourtls of its liabilities. The finding, or
the opinion of the court, did not debar the legislature from taking
such legislative action as it deemed just.
A repeal of a charter does not of itself violate or impair the
obligations of any contract which the corporation has entered into.
But the legislature cannot establish such rules in regard to the"
n.inagene,,t and disposition of the assets of the corporation, that
the avails shall be diverted from or divided unfairly and unequally
among the creditors, and thus impair the obligation of contracts,
or that the portion of the avails which belong to the stockholders
shall be sequestered and diverted from the owners, and thus injure
vested rights.
"The capital and debts of banking and other moneyed corporations constitute a trust fund, and pledge for the payment of
creditors and stockholders, and a court of equity will lay hold of
the fund and see that it be duly collected and applied. * * *
A law distributing the -proceeds of an insolvent trading or banking corporation among its stockholders, or giving it to strangers,
or seizing it to tme use of the state, would as clearly impair the
obligation of its contracts, as a law giving to the heirs the effects
of a deceased natural person, to the exclusion of his creditors,
would impair the obligation of his contracts :" Curran v. ,S'tate
of Arkansas, 15 How. 312.
The legislature has also the right, as an administrative measure, to appoint a trustee, to take the assets and manage the affairs
of a corporation, whose charter has been repealed, in conformity
with the general, just rules which it has prescribed, or with the
rules of a court of equity, if no statutory provisions have been
enacted. If no trustee is appointed by the legislature, " a court
of equity, which never allows a trust to fail for want of a trustee,
would see to the execution of that trust, although by the dissolution of the corporation, the legal title to the property had been
changed :" Curranv. Arkansas, cited supra.

The complainants do not controvert, in the main, the principles
which have been stated, but they contend that, while the legislature had the right to repeal this charter, it has not been in fact
repealed; and, if it has been repealed, that the provisions by which
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the commissioner was appointed to hold the assets subject to the
order of the Chief Justice, who does not act as a judge, but merely
as a committee, and whose directions are not subject to appeal or
review, and the provision that the title to the assets shall be vested
in the commissioner, are invalid, and that the resolution is void.
It is contended that:1. The preamble is void, because the legislature has no power
to find facts which may affect private rights, and that the preamble
is so interwoven with the re'olution, that, being void, the resolution
is void also.
It -is
true that the facts recited in a preamble of a private statute
are not evidence, as between the person for whose benefit the act
as passed, and a third person, and that a legislature has no
power to find facts by legislative enactment, so as to be evidence
in suits against persons who were not applicants for the act:
.Elmondorf v. Carmiclael,3 Little 472; Parmelee v. .Thomnpson,
7 Hill 80. This is an obvious rule of evidence, but it has no
application here. If,as is admitted, the legislature had power
to repeal the charter, it had the power to -state the reasons which
induced it to act. A statement of the reasons was not indispensable to the validity of the repeal; but was proper for the information of the public and of the corporation. This resolution is
not a judicial act, finding that a forfeiture of the charter has taken
place. If it was, it could well be urged that a legislature has not
ordinarily judicial powers, and that the attempt to exercise judicial
functions is void; but the resolution is a legislative act, declaring
the repeal, and not the forfeiture of the charter, and the recitals
are not in the nature of judicial findings of facts, but the statement
of the reasons which operated upon the legislative mind.
"The inquiry into the affairs or defaults of a corporation with
a view to continue or discontinue it, is not a judicial act. No
issue is formed. No decree or judgment is passed. No forfeiture
is adjudged. No fine or punishment is imposed. But an inquiry
is had in such form as is deemed most wise and expedient, with a
view to ascertain facts upon which to exercise legislative power, or
to learn whether a contingency has happened upon which legislative action is required :" Creasev. Babcock, 23 Pick. 344.
2. The complainants insist that the legislature must of itself
determine whether an enactment shall or shall not be a law, and

LOTHROP v. STEDINAN.

cannot delegate the power to make or repeal laws; that the attempted repeal of this charter is delegated to the insurance commissioner, and is therefore void.
The resolution provides that the charter shall be repealed on
September 1st 1875; provided, if the company shall, before that
day, receive a certificate that the deficiency in its assets has been
supplied, then the charter shall remain in full force; and, in case
of a disagreement between the commissioner and the company as
to the amount of its assets, the Chief Justice and his associate shall
determine and state the amount to be paid in, and if the amount
so found shall be paid within thirty days, the resolution shall be
inoperative and void. I am inclined to the opinion that, by this
resolution, the charter was repealed, but the repeal was not to take
effect, or be operative, if a specified event should thereafter take
place, which event was uncertain. The commissioner, subject to
an appeal to the Chief Justice and a judge of the Superior Court,
was to determine whether that event had taken place. The legislature, for itself, determined and enacted that the charter should be
repealed, provided an event did not occur in the future : the ascertainment and announcement that the event had happened the legislature entrusted to an officer, or a committee, whom it designated.
The legislature delegated to no one the power to determine whether
the charter should or should not be repealed. It delegated
the duty of ascertaining whether a fact existed, upon the existence of which it had determined that the repeal should not go
into effect.
"A valid statute may be passed to take effect upon the happening of some future event. Certain, or uncertain, it is a law i
presenti, to take effect in future. The event, or change of circumstances, must be such as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects
the question of the expediency of the law. The legislature in
effect, declares the law inexpedient if the event should not happen,
expedient if it should happen. They appeal to nobody to judge
of its expediency :" .Barto v. Hirod,8 N. Y. 483, per RuG;
GLES, C. J.
3. The complainants further say that the charter is not repealed
until after the decision of Judge PARK and his associate; that the
legislature has no power, either before or after the repeal, to take
the assets of an insurance company out of the hands of its officers,
and to transfer the custody of the property to a third person, who
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is to hold them, subject to the order of an individual, acting not
as a judge, and exercising no judicial functions, and not necessarily guided by the principles of law, and from whose order there
is no appeal; that the resolve is a special and personal statute,

prescribing an exceptional and peculiar rule of conduct upon this
single corporation ; and therefore unjust, and in violation of legislative power.
The original resolution, which was reported to the legislature,
contained the first proviso only. As reported, it manifestly provided that the charter should be repealed on September Ist 1875,
unless upon the happening of a certain event, the repeal should
not go into effect. An amendment was added, by which in case
of disagreement between the commissioner and the insurance
company, another committee was appointed to ascertain the
amount of deficiency, if any, and if the amount, so ascertained,
should be paid in, the resolution should be inoperative and void.
It is a question which it is not now necessary to determine whether
the charter is already repealed, or whether its repeal occurs at
the expiration of the time which is limited for payment of the
deficiency, if any there be, which may be found by the two judges,
and upon non-payment of the amount. I have already suggested
that the true construction is that the charter is repealed, to take
effect or not to take effect, upon the happening of an uncertain
event. If the charter is repealed, there can be no doubt of the
power of a legislature to appoint some person to act merely as
custodian of the assets of the corporation. But assuming that the
charter is now in existence and unrepealed, I am of the opinion
that the legislature has the power, if in 'their opinion the public
interest and the rights of the creditors of a particular corporation
demand it, to take away the custody of the assets of such corporation from its directors and intrust the custody to an officer of the
state, pending an investigation into the company's solvency, and
the determination of the fact whether the event has happened upon
which a repeal of the charter will take place. It is apparent from
an inspection of the resolution that the legislature deemed the corporation "insolvent, and that the liabilities exceeded the assets
$400,000, and also was of opinion that the corporation had not
complied with the requirements of law and that the affairs of the
company were in so. precarious a position that it was proper to
take the unusual step of repealing the charter. But the legisla-
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ture was also willing to give the company an opportunity of making good the deficiency, and further was willing not to permit the
decision of the insurance commissioner, upon the question whether
the deficiency had been supplied, to be final, but to i,,trust the
final hearing and determination in regard to the sufficiency of
assets to two persons, whose judicial position peculiarly adapts
them to pass upon disputed questions of facts, and whose official
claracter precludes the suspicion that injustice might be done, and
should assure the creditors that their rights are to be guarded.
That investigation would necessarily consume time. The question
presented itself, Do the itnterests of the cestuie que trust in the property of the company require that, during the investigation, the
assets, which in our opinion have seriously impaired, shall remain
in the hands of the directors? The legislature decided to place
the assets, for the time being, in the custody of an officer of the
state, and derived their power so to do from the general power
which had been reserved over the affairs of this particular corporation, that of amendment of its charter at its pleasure. "Whatever
might be true, if the charter was a close one, the General Assembly could impose upon the defendants any additional conditions,
or burthens connected with the grant which they might deem
necessary for the protection or welfare of the public, and which
they might originally, and with justice have imposed :" English
v. N. If"'. -Northampton Co., 82 Conn. 243; Commissioners, gc.,
v. ifolyoke IMaterpower Co., 104 Mass. 446. It is not necessary
that the resolution should be styled an amendment: Bishop v.
Brainard,28 Conn. 298. The legislature has reserved to itself
the control of this charter, and can modify it to meet any exigency
which may arise in the affairs of the corporation ; and where the
legislature has determined that the pecuniary interests of the creditors are so imperilled that the necessity of repealing the charter
may arise, it would seem that the legislature has the power to provide that the officer, who has the oversight of all the insurance
companies of the state, is the proper person to have the exclusive
custody of the assets of this corporation, and act as the treasurer
for the time being. The legislature could originally have imposed
this condition upon the company: they can impose it at any time
when they deem it necessary for the protection or welfare of the
corporation.
It is also earnestly contended that the resolution directs the corn-
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missioner to hold the assets subject to the order of a committee,
not acting judicially, and from whose order there is no appeal,
and who in his directions is not necessarily acting in conformity
with principles of law.
It is true that the Chief Justice will act as a committee or agent
of the legislature, and not strictly in his judicial capacity, and if
the resolution and the general statutes in regard to life insurance
corporations, whose charters have been repealed, placed the assets
under the control of a committee, to be disposed of as the committee pleased, and without the control of the courts of the state,
such acts would properly be the subject of severe criticism, and
might be declared to be inoperative. This resolution simply
empowers the commissioner to hold the assets. He cannot sell
or dispose of them under the resolution, but is merely their
custodian.
The Chief Justice has only authority to notify the commissioner
either to return the assets to the company, or that the event has
not taken place upon which the repeal of the charter is avoided,
after which the commissioner is to be governed by the general
statute.
He then becomes a trustee under the exclusive direction and
control of a court of equity, and subject to its decrees.
The assets are not to be manage6 dr disposed of, and the avails
are not to be paid in accordance with the order of a committee,
but in pursuance of the general statutes and under the direction
of the Superior Court, a court of general jurisdiction, and of full
chancery powers. The weight of the complainants' argument
bore upon the clause of the resolution which they considered most
unjust and prejudicial to their interests. I think that they misapprehend the nature of the powers of the Chief Justice over the
assets, which is so limited that there is no interference with the
rights of creditors.
Upon the argument of the motion, the provisions of the general
statute were criticised by the complainants. The bill does not ask
for the interference of the court upon the ground of the invalidity
of the statute, but the court is asked to prevent the commissioner
from taking possession of the assets under the authority of a resolution of the General Assembly, which is alleged to be void. I do
not deem it therefore incumbent upon me at the time to consider
the cLaracter of the statute.
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The suggestion which has been made in regard to the control of
the legislature over those charters, in which a power of amendment or repeal has been reserved, applies to the objection that this
resolution is a special and peculiar law by which the rights of this
corporation are to be jeopardized, differing from the law applicable
to all other corporations in like condition. All insurance companies in Connecticut are created by special charter. Each company is under the particular supervision of the legislature, and is
liable, in case of insolvency or malfeasance, to be controlled by
such action, applicable to the special case, as shall serve to protect
creditors, or shareholders, or the public.
Sundry affidavits were read for the purpose of showing that
Mr. Stedman had not informed the company, prior to September
1st, of the amount of the alleged deficiency, and had not given
the company an opportunity to supply the required amount, and
had not acted justly towards the company since the passage of this
resolution. Counter affidavits were presented by the commissioner.
If any steps were to be taken by the commissioner in advance of
the action of the company, prior to September 1st, in regard to
which I express no opinion, I am not satisfied that the commis-.
sioner failed to do whatever the resolution, or the statutes, or the
duty which he owed to the corporation, or to the public, imposed
upon him. The corporation does not seem to me to have suffered
in consequence of a neglect of the commissioner to keep them
informed of his views and wishes.
The motion for a provisional injunction is denied, and the restraining order now in force is vacated.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
THE STATE Ex REL. LYNCH v. BRATTON.*
The father is prind facie entitled to the custody of his children, and where he is
of good character and able and willing.to maintain them, his right is paramount
Jo that of all other persons, except in the single case of an infant of such tender,
years as to necessarily require for its own good the care of its mother.
But the father's right is not absolute or unqualified.
Ie may relinquish or forfeit it by contract, by his bad conduct or by his misfortune in being unable to give
it proper care and support.
* We are indebted to W. C. Spruance, Esq., for the report of this cas.-ED.
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Where a father has, through his fault or his misfortune, lost or forfeited his right,
and subsequently, by reformation or otherwise, reinstates himself in a position to
properly care for and maintain his child, his right loes not necessarily revive, but
a court upon habeas corpits will exercise a sound discretion in view of all -the circumstances with reference to the welfare of the child itself.
A court will never order a child into the custody of an improper person, but
where the child has reached the age of discretion the court will in many cases
allow it to make its own choice, even though it choose a person whom the court
would not voluntarily appoint.
There is no fixed age at which the period of discretion is considered to begin.
It depends on the capacity of the child to reason sensibly, though as a child, in regard to its condition, its feelings, and its future welfare.

Courts have no jurisdiction over the religious discipline and instruction of
children. Such matters are proper to be taken into consideration among other
circumstances, in determining the custody of children where it is in dispute, but a
difference in regard to religious views does not of itself afford any ground for
interference by the court on petition of a father who has lost or forfeited his right
of custody, with the person who has acquired such right.
HABEAS CORPUS.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
WALES, J.-The writ of habeas corpus in this case was issued
upon the petition of John F. Lynch, and directed to James
Bratton, commanding him to bring before me the persons therein
named, together with the cause of their being taken and'detained.
On the day appointed for the return of the writ and the hearing
of the petition, Mr. Bratton produced the persons named in the
writ, to wit: Mary Lynch, aged 16; John Lynch, aged 9, and
James B. Lynch, aged 6; and also made a return in writing and
under oath, in which he certifies the causes of their detention by
him. The substance of them is that the said Mary, John and
James arc the children of John F. Lynch and Emma J. Lynch,
who were married on the 5th of February 1856; that Emma was
the daughter of the respondent, who, in the month of October 1859,
finding that the relator was unable to support his wife and two
children, William, then two years old, and Mary, an infant of
three weeks, took them to his oivn house, where they remained
until March 1866; that during this interval Emma and her children
lived separate from the relator, who contributed nothing whatever
to their support ; that in the early part of 1866 Emma and her
children went to live with the relator in Wilmington, where he
had commenced business; that about this time, or shortly after,
.the relator acquired habits of intemperance which grew to be so

THE STATE Ex REL. LYNCH v. BRATTO

confirmed and excessive that he not only neglecteiW to provide for
his family, but treated them with extreme cruelty, so that in December 1870, the said Mary was compelled to return to her father's
house and has ever since lived with the respondent; that for three
years the relator paid no rent, and the respondent had to contribute to the support of the said Emma and her children; and
that finally, on the 14th of March 18T3, in consequence of the
continued intemperance, neglect and cruelty of her husband, Mrs.
Lynch obtained from the legislature of Delaware an act of divorce,
a vinculo, by the 2d section of which it was enacted, " That the
said Emma J. Lynch shall have the sole care, charge and custody
of her children." The return further sets forth that on the 10th
of August 1873, the said Emma died, having committed the care
of her children to the said respondent and his wife, who took them
and have ever since wholly maintained them, except so far as the
wages of the eldest child, William, aided in his support; that said
William died in August 1874, at the house of the respondent;
that the relator in April 1874, married again, and now resides in
Philadelphia; that the respondent is able and anxious to support
the said children, who are much attached to him and his wife, and
desire to remain with them ; that it would be greatly detrimental
to the interests of the children to remove them from their present
home and commit them to the custody of the relator, who by his
violent temper, his intemperate and improvident habits, is wholly
unfit to take care of them, and has foffeited all right to them, and
that in addition to this, whatever right of custody he may have
had is completely annulled by the act of divorce.
To this return there was a general denial on the part of the
relator, but more particularly to that portion of it relating to his
present character and conduct and his fitness to have charge of the
children. It was alleged that since his last marriage he has reformed his habits and established a new position in society, entitling him to the respect and confidence of his friends and neighbors, and to the restoration of his paternal rights.
A number of witnesses testified to the material facts contained
in the return, and the private act of divorce, duly authorized and
recorded, was exhibited. One witness swore that he had seen the
relator intoxicated since his last marriage.
On the part of the relator it was shown, that for nearly two
years past his life has been industrious, sober and reputable; that
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he is carrying on a fair business, and is able to maintain and educate his children. Oil these grounds it Was claimed by his counsel
that the only question to be considered was, whether John F.
Lynch is not fit and capable to have the charge of his children, he
having the legal right to their custody; since the legislative act
assigning them to their mother, being in the nature of an interlocutory decree, was not final or conclusive, and the trust thereby
imposed on the mother not being transmissible by descent, on her
death the rights of the father revived. Itwas also argued that
something was due to the repentance and reformation of the relator
It is not necessary to review the evidence in detail. Enough
has been stated to afford room for the application of the legal
principles which will govern and control the decision of the case.
These principles are to be found in the modern text-books, and in
A long and ample current of authorities from Lord MANSFIELD'S
time to the present. The right of the father to the custody of his
infant child grows out of his duty to maintain, educate and protect
it, and while he gives it education and] support, he is entitled to
its services. But this right is not an absolute one, and is often
made to yield when the best interests of the child require that it
should. Society, also, has, an interest in the welfare and morals
of children, and it is for the public that, in determining questions
of custody, the good of the child should be the leading consideration. Where the father is a man of fair character, of a just disposition, and is able and willing to take care of and provide for
his children, he is vested with the paramount right to their custody. The only exception to this is in the case of an infant of
tender years, whose helpless condition and physical wants require
the nurture of its mother: D'Hauteville's Case (Pamph.) As
long as he retains this character and ability he cannot be deprived
of his paternal rights; but he may lose or forfeit these rights by
his own voluntary act, by his misconduct, or by his misfortunes.
He may emancipate his child by contract, as when be consents to
its adoption by another, or.sends it abroad to make a living and
shijft for itself: Farrellv. Farrell,3 Houst. 633, or abandons it to
the world; by his conduct, when he neglects to provide for its support, treats it with excesssive cruelty, or leads such a grossly immoral and profligate life as to endanger its morals and corrupt its
heart by his evil example; by his misfortune, when he becomes
'unable, through poverty, to maintain it, or by insanity, or by a
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long involuntary absence, during which the child, thrown on the
charity of the world, has formed new relations and found a new
home.
Yet in all these cases the law has such a tender regard for the
natural affection and rights of the parent, and for the welfare and
happiness of the child, that, if the latter hag reached the age of
discretion, the court, under a habeas corpus, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, will remove all restraint, and allow it to make its
own choice, and go where it pleases, but will never order it into
the custody of an improper person, or under some circumstances
permit it to go into such custody. The age of discretion is ascertained not only by the years of the child, but by its capacity, information, intelligence and judgment. The court will look to all
these evidences of capacity, and "if it finds the child able to reason
sensibly, though as a child, in regard to its condition and its preferences and its prospects, it will take its wishes into consideration." In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 3 Mete. 72, Chief Justice SHAW
said, "In point of law, a child of such tender years, seven or
eight, has no will, no power of judging or electing; and therefore
his will and choice are to be wholly disregarded. The natural and
strong feelings of a child, which induce him to cling instinctively
to those whom he has been accustomed to regard as his natural
protectors, cannot be regarded as the exercise of a legal will or an
intelligent course." In Commonwealth v. .Hammond, 10 Pick.
274, the child was between eleven and twelve, and its wishes were
consulted. In The People v. (hegaray, 18 Wend. 637, there
were three children, aged respectively fifteen, thirteen and nine
years.
They were all consulted respecting their wishes. In
Ne-Dowle's Case, 18 Johns. 328, the youngest child was not more
than nine, and was consulted in respect to his wishes not only by
the chief justice, but afterwards, on a suggestion that improper
means had been used by the master, by three gentlemen of the bar
appointed by the court, and his wishes were respected. In State
v. Scott et ux., 10 Foster 274, the child was eleven years old. The
court appointed a committee of three members of the bar to interrogate the child, who reported that she was of sufficient understanding to choose, and the court suffered her to make her election.
These and other like cases show the standard and mode by which
courts are accustomed to ascertain the age of discretion. It was
on the application of this rule that, at the outset of the hearing,
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the relator through his counsel withdrew his demand for the custody of his daughter Mary, upon her expressing her choice to
remain with the respondent. The two younger children are not
quite enough advanced imnage or understanding to come within the
rule of discretionary choice, and their custody must therefore be
decided on the general principles already stated, and the particular
circumstances of the present case. In Rex v. Delaval et al., 8
Burr. 1484, decided in 1763, it was held by Lord MANSFIELD, that
the court is bound ex debito justitice to set the infants free from
improper restraint ; but they are not bound'to deliver them over
to anybody, nor to give them any privileges. This must be left
to their own discretion according to the circumstances that shall
appear before them." And in the same opinion he said, " the true
rule is, the court are to judge upon the circumstances of the particular case, and to give their directions accordingly." Chancellor
WALWOnTII, in Mercien v. The People, 25 Wend. 64, says, "The
American cases show it to be the established law of this country
that the court or officers are authorized to exercise a discretion ;
and that the father was not entitled to demand a delivery
of the child to him, upon habeas eorpus, as an absolute right."
Chief Justice SHAW, in Commonwealth v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 208,
,where the court laid down the stringent rule of the paramount
authority of the father, decides that, "1As a general rule the writ
of habeas corpus and all actions upon it are governed by the judicial discretion of the court, in directing* which all the circumstances are to be taken into consideration. In the case of a child
of tender years, the good of the child is to be regarded as the
prominent one." In that case the wife had separated fiom her
husband without lawful cause, taking with her their only child,
and, in allusion to this circumstance, the learned chief justice further remarks: "The court ought not to sanction the unauthorized
separation of husband and wife by ordering the child into the custody of the mother, thus separated and out of the custody of the
father. If there be any good cause of divorce, either a vineulo
or a mensa, and proceedings are instituted, the court will then
make such order as to the custody both of the wife and the children as the circumstances of the case may require." In the
D'Hauteville Case, heard before the court of General Sessions of
Philadelphia, in 1840, it was decided by the court, and admitted
by the counsel of the relator. who was seeking possession of his
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child, that the right of the father to the custody of his child
becomes forfeited either by his unfitness to take charge of its
morals and interests, or by such misconduct as would afford good
ground for a divorce a vinculo nzatrimnonii. There was no authority
cited on the part of the relator in the case now before me, qualifying, much less contradicting, any of the doctrines just used. The
case in 2 Conn. 20 re.latdd to the settlement of a pauper child
whose parents had been divorced, and was a contest between two
towns as to which of them should be burdened with its support,
and did not touch the question of custody. It is the common
practice when a divorce has been obtained, either by legislative
enactment or by a judicial decree, that the children are taken from
the party for whose fault the divorce was granted, and given to the
innocent parent. In this respect the ease of the relator is not an
exceptional one.
In view of these principles and of the evidence submitted at the
hearing, it is difficult to understand on what ground or pretence
the relator can demand the possession of his children, except upon
the theory that there has grown up in his heart a new and sincere
love for his offspring, consequent upon his reformation and his
repentance for the past, and that he desires from the purest and
best motives that can actuate human conduct, to have their custody, that he may enjoy the comfort and pleasure of their society.
But all this, while it may excite sympathy and move to pity, does
not restore his forfeited rights, which are, as far as concerns this
proceeding, as if they had never existed. There is no element of
principle or of fact to reason upon in his favor. The law and the
evidence combine to pronounce against his claim. No reported
case can be found in which there is less show of right. Admitting
that the death of Mrs. Lynch repealed the act of divorce, and that
the guardianship of the children was not assignable by her, it does
not follow that the father is entitled to have them. After the
granting of the divorce and during the life of the mother, he certainly could not have claimed their custody. On her death, they
found a new home and formed new relations. Where could they
have gone, if the respondent had not opened his heart and house to
receive them ? The relator had no home to shelter or means to
support them. Save for the respondent they might have been cast
upon the charity of the public. But the act of the legislature is
still in force and is conclusive. It abrogated the right of Lynch
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to the care and control of his children, and only by their consent
can that right be retrieved.
The temporal welfare, and interests of the children would not be
promoted by removing them from their grand-parents, but it was
argued that their father was entitled to direct their religious training, that they were now being taught in a creed contrary to his;
and would be trained up to despise and contemn him. It will perhaps depend more on his own future conduct whether his children
learn to repeat his name with respect or otherwise, than upon the
teachings of those with whom they now live and associate. If he
suffers from having his children worship according to a faith different from his own, that is only another consequence of his past
course. But it may also be suggested in reply to this argument
that the wishes of the mother as to the religious faith of the
children should not be forgotten, and are deserving of at least
equal consideration. What those wishes were may be inferred
from the testimony of the relator's brother. They were not coincident with those of her husband. Over the religious discipline
and instruction of children, courts have no jurisdiction. Human
laws deal only with the civil rights and duties belonging to the
relation of parent and child: 3 Houst 689. A case might possibly arise in which the religious faith of the relator or of the
respondent, might be taken into consideration and turn ihe scale
which would otherwise be even; but the present case is far removed from one of that character.
The appointment of a guardian by the Orphans' Court might
be governed by reference to the faith of the minors' parents if
brought especially to the notice of the court, and there appeared
to be a design to obtain the guardianship. with the intent to
seduce the child from the belief of its fathers. There is, however,
no analogy of principle or similarity of fact in the manner of
making such appointments to the matter here under discussion.
The reformation of the relator is too short-lived to build more
than a hope upon.
I have thus briefly noticed all the points taken by the relator's
counsel. They were urged with much zeal and plausibility; but
his positions cannot be maintained either on principle or authority;
and putting aside the learning of the books and the weight of precedents the case has no better foundation in morals or in reason.
The children are remanded to the custody of Mr. Bratton.

NEFF v.PENNOYER.

United States Circuit Court, .District of Oregon.
M1AROUS NEFF v. SYLVESTER PENNOYER.
A state has tile power to subject the property of non-residents, within its territorial limits, to the satisfaction of the claims of her citizens by any mode of procedure which it may deem proper and convenient, and therefore may, for such
purpose, authorize a judgment to be given against such non-resident prior to seizure of such property and with or without notice of the proceeding.
But where a title depending on such ex parteaction comes before a court of another jurisdiction, the proceedings will be closely examined to see that all the
statutory requirements for their validity have been complied with.
The common-law presumption in favor of the jurisdiction and regularity of the
proceedings of courts of record of general jurisdiction, had its origin in the fact
.that at common law no judgment could be given against a defendant until lie had
appeared in the action ; but no such presumption does or ought to apply in cases
where the defendant is a non-resident, and there was no appearance, and only constructive service of the summons by publication.
Tnis was an action to recover the possession of a half section
of land situate in Multnomah county, the same being donation
claim 57.
It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was a citizen
of California, and the owner, and entitled to the possession of the
premises; and that the defendant was a citizen of Oregon and
wrongfully withheld the possession of the premises from the

plaintiff.
The answer of the defendant tacitly admitted the citizenship of
the parties and the value of the premises, as alleged in the complaint, but denied the ownership of the plaintiff and his right to
the possession of the premises, and set up a title thereto in himself. The defence of title in the defendant was controverted by
the reply.
By consent'of parties the cause was tried by the court without
the intervention of a jury, and afterwards submitted on briefs.
John IF. W7Walley, H. WF.
plaintiff.
H.

Fechheimer and I.

IF Page, for

F. Tho mpson and George T. -Durham,for defendant.

DEADY, J.-On the trial the plaintiff proved that a patent to
the premises was issued to him by the United States on March
19th 1866, as a settler under the Donation Act of September 27th
1850, and rested his case.
Thereupon the defendant offered in evidence duly certified copies
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of the complaint, summons, order for publication of summons, affidavit of service by publication and judgment in the action of J. IT.
Mitehell v. Marcus i.ff, in the Circuit Court of the county of
MIultnomah, wherein judgment was given against the defendant
therein on February 19th 1866, for the sum of $294.98; to the
introduction of which papers the plaintiff objected, because: (1)
said judgment is in personam and appears to have been given
without the appearance of the defendant in the action or personal
service of the summons upon him and while he was a non-resident
of the state, and is therefore void ; (2) said judgment is not in rem,
and therefore constitutes no basis of title in the defendant; (3)
said copies of complaint, &c., do not show jurisdiction to give the
judgment alleged, either in rem or personam; and (4) it appears
fromu said papers that no proof of service by publication was ever
made, the affidavit thereof being made by the " editor" of the
Pacific Christian Advocate and not by "tthe printer or his foreman
or his principal clerk." The court admitted the evidence, subject
to the objections.
The defendant then offered in evidence a certified copy of an
execution issued upon said judgment on July 9th 1866, and the
return thereon, from which it appears that the premises in question were sold upon said execution to satisfy said judgment on
August 7th 1866, to J. H. Mitchell, for the sum of $341.60, to the
introduction of which papers the plaintiff objected, because the
judgment in Mitctell v. Neff being given without jurisdiction, the
execution was void, and further, that the notice of sale upon said
execution and attached to the return was no part of either, and
therefore should not be admitted. The court admitted the evidence, subject to the objections.
The defendant then offered in evidence three papers, purporting
to be deeds to the premises to the defendant, the first being signed
by Jacob Stitzel, sheriff of Multnomah county, by his deputy, C.
B. Upton, on January 14th 1867; the second, by said Stitzel, exsheriff of said county, on July 24th 1874; and the third, by E.
J. Jeffery, sheriff of said county, on July 21st 1874; to the introduction of which papers the plaintiff objected, because as to the
first one: 1. It was not made to the purtaser at the sheriff's
sale. 2. It is not sealed, witnessed or properly acknowledged as
a deed. As to the second one: 1. There being no valid judg.
maent proved, the instrument is not a link in the chain of title.
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2. It was not made to the purchaserat the sheriff's sale; and as
to the third one, for the same reasons as in case of the second one,
with the additional one! That it was not executed by the officer
making the sale. The court admitted the evidence, subject to the
objections.
The defendant then offered in evidence an assignment by 5. I.
Mitchell to the defendant of the certificate of purchase of the premises, dated August 10th 1866, to the introduction of which the
plaintiff objected, because: 1. There being no valid judgment,
assignment is not evidence of title in the defendant. 2. If there
were a valid judgment to support the sale to Mitchell, the assignment would pass a mere equity to the defendant, to enforce a conveyance from the former after be had received one from the sheriff,
and therefore it is not evidence of title in the defendant.. The
court admitted the evidence, subject to the objections.
The defendant having rested, the plaintiff offered in evidence a
duly certified copy of the judgment-roll in Jfitchell v. N'eff, which
contained not only the complaint, summons and other parts of the
record of that case already introduced by the defendant, but also a
copy of the affidavit of the plaintiff therein, upon which the order
for publicatibn was made; to the introduction of which the defendant objected, because said affidavit was not properly a part of the
judgment-roll. The court admitted the evidence, subject to the
objections.
Upon this evidence, the right of the plaintiff to recover is
admitted, unless by virtue of the sale of the premises upon the
judgment in Mitchell v. 2'eff, and the subsequent assignments of
the certificate of purchase and the conveyances to the defendant,
the legal title passed from the plaintiff to him.
Admitting that the proceedings in Mitchell v. Neff were duly
taken according to the statute of the state in the case of non-resident debtors, what was the effect or force of the judgment as
against the person of the defendant or his property? It is admitted on all hands that such a judgment is not binding in per8onarn: Story's Con. of Laws, § 539; .D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11
How. 174; Galpn v. Page, 18 Wall. 367. And this rule is expressly declared in the Or. Code of C. P., § 506, as follows: "No
natural person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of this state,
unless be appear in the court, or be found within the state, or be a
resident thereof, or have property therein; and in thbe last case
Vol. XXIV.-47
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only to the extent of such property at the time the jurisdiction
attached."
Neither is it claimed by the defendant that this judgment had
any other or greater effect than to enable the plaintiff therein to
subject this property to the payment 'of the debt owed him by
Neff.
But the plaintiff maintains that the court, in Mitchell v. Neff,
could not acquire jurisdiction to reach the property of a non-resident or subject it to the payment of his debts, owed in this state,
except by the actual seizure of such property contemporaneous
'ith the commencement of the proceeding or before the rendition
of the judgment therein.
In support of this position, the case of Galpin v. Page,decided
by lfr. Justice FIELD, in the Circuit Court for the District of
California, on August 31st 1874, is cited. In this case the learned
judge, after showing that "the tribunals of one state have no jurisdiction, and can have none, over persons and property without its
territorial limits," proceeds as follows: "But over property and
persons within those limits the authority of the state is supreme,
except as restrained by the Federal Constitution. When, therefore, property thus situated is held by parties resident without the
state, or ibsent from it, and thus beyond the reach of the process
of its courts, the admitted jurisdiction of the state over the property would be defeated if a substituted service upon the parties
were not permitted. Accordingly, under special circumstances,
upon the presentation of particular proofs, substituted service, in
lieu of personal service, is allowed by statute in nearly all the
states, so as to subject the property of a non-resident or absent
party to such disposition by their tribunals as may be necessary to
protect the rights of their own citizens. * * * A pure personal
judgment, not used as a means of reaching property at the time
in the state, or affecting some interest therein, or determining the
status of the plaintiff, rendered against a non-resident of the state,
not having been personally served within its limits, and not appearing to the action, would not be a judicial determination of the
rights of the parties, but an arbitrary declaration by the tribunals
of the state as to the liability of a party over whose person and property they have no control. The validity of the statute can only
be sustained by restricting its application to cases where, in connection with the process against the person, property in the statQ
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is brought under the control of the court and subjected to its judgment, or where the judgment is sought simply as a means of reaching such property or affecting some interest therein, or to cases
where the action relates to the personal status of the plaintiff in
the state."
But I see nothing in this language or the rule as there laid
down, which supports or gives countenance to the position of the
plaintiff, unless it be in the statement that the statute giving the
right to proceed by publication against non-residents of the state
is valid only when restricted "to cases where, in connection with
the process against the person, property in the state is brought
under the control of the court and subjected to its judgment."
Now, the property was "brought under the control of the court
and subjected to its judgment" in Mitchell v. Neff, if at all, by the
execution which issued upon the judgment. This process against
the property of Neff was issued to enforce the judgment given in
pursuance of the process against his person. The one was the inception and the other the completion of the proceeding, and so they
were connected together as the links in a chain. Certainly, the
process against the property could issue in connection with the process against the person without being exactly simultaneous with
it. They were related parts of the same proceeding.
Besides, this judgment, though personal in form, was procured,
intended and used simply as a means of reaching the property of
Neff then within the state, and according to the rule in Galpin v.
Page, supra, is so far valid and binding.
But the power of the state over the property within its limits,
of non-residents, being supreme, and it being admitted on all hands
that the state mav subject such property "to such disposition by
their tribunals as may be necessary to protect the rights of its own
citizens," in my judgment, the mode of exercising this power is a
matter for the state to determine. In the exercise of this power
it may require that the proceeding be strictly in rei and commenced by the seizure of the property, or it may, as provided in
this state, upon the proper preliminary showing, permit a suit to
be maintained against the non-resident by name-nominally-for
the purpose of enabling the plaintiff therein to first judicially establish his right or claim against such non-resident, and then authorize the seizure and disposition of the property so as to satisfy the
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same. In either case the result is the same; while the latter
mode of proceeding has this to commend it over the former, that
it does not permit the seizure or interference with the property of
the non-resident until the right or claim of the citizen in or to it
is satisfactorily established.
Nor does it appear to me that the state is bound in any case to
provide for giving notice to the absent party by publication of the
summons or otherwise. That matter pertains to the mode of proceeding over which the state has absolute control. The notice
usually given is merely constructive, and in a large number, if not
in a majority, of cases, gives no information to the absent party.
Of course it is the duty of the state to deal justly and considerately with non-residents who have property within her jurisdiction,
and therefore it should provide as far as practicable that no proceeding should be taken in her courts to affect such property, without notice to the owner.
It being shown that the state has the power to, subject the property of non-residents to the payment of debts owing to her citizens
by such a proceeding as may by law be provided, including one in
which such property is not seized prior to judgment, but thereafter, and *then only for the purpose of satisfying said judgment, it
remains to be considered whether the judgment in Mitchell v.
Ni ff was given by a court having jurisdiction to do so according
to the laws of the state. * * *

[The learned judge then proceeds to consider, in detail, the
objections to the proceedings, and decides that, as the affidavit on
-which the order of publication was based did not comply with the
requirements of the statute, the court liad never obtained jurisdiction, and the proceedings were void. This part of the opinion is
omitted as purely local.]
Judgment for plaintiff.
-t

